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1. Introduction
Before the latter half of 1980’s, an internalization approach and a transaction cost
approach applied to the theory of the multinational enterprise (Hereafter, described as MNE)
were meaningful as they could help explain why MNEs come to grow based on a sort of
general theory. But thereafter these approaches have become losing the explanative power
since international strategic alliances were employed by MNEs in order to enter the target
market in which MNE can retain their strength.
For this phenomenon, internalization behavior of MNEs tended to lose rationality. Due to it,
internalization and transaction cost theories were unbelievably fallen in the bottom, as long
as they address the growth of MNEs.
On the other hand, to be noticed, Dunning, J. H. & Rugman, A. have remained their
assertions that an internalization approach has been going on the first level without having a
doubt of explaining when and why MNEs enter their target markets even if strategic
alliances are chosen, although the resource-based view has been combined with a transaction
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cost approach in their recent works.
In this article the possible validity of their assertions are reviewed for MNE facing with
an alternative option of strategic alliances in terms of filling up the failure of Rugman’s
earliest traditional model of MNEs’ foreign market entry strategies (1981). At the same
time, we should review Rugman’s model in which each one optimal entry mode per MNEs’
growth stage is assumed. Then we focus on modifying the Rugman’s traditional model to
propose MNEs can simultaneously develop the same foreign market with two types of entry
modes at the given time. In the second, we examine OEM can be effectively chosen to take
advantage of utilizing managerial resources of both business partners (a leader and a
follower) without neglecting some sort of transaction costs.
Thirdly information costs and communication costs are built in the selection of foreign
market entry modes, in which their relationships with transaction costs are discussed.
Fourthly let us apply the revised transaction cost approach to the entry modes selection for
software developers. Finally the possibility of integrating the resource-based view and the
concept of architecture with transaction cost approach can be proposed.
2. Modeling plural foreign market entry modes in a given country
Figure 1 shows the sequential market entry model depending on the dissipation costs of
knowledge in which MNEs can internalize or externalize alongside with the value of their
knowledge over time, when summing up the Rugman’s theory of the MNE.
Apparently we may think this model dynamic. To be more accurate, however, three
stages model is seen in Figure 1. Rugman emphasizes the big role of dissipation costs of
knowledge when leasing a parent’s technology to a local independent company. Due to its
costs, each MNE has to select setting up a wholly-owned subsidiary (internalization) in
terms of foreign direct investment in the earlier stage after exporting from a parent company
becomes no best entry mode in an imperfect target market country imposing tariff on the
parent company. Each MNE prefers foreign direct investment to licensing considering high
dissipation costs accompanied with licensing in the earlier stage where the knowledge value
of a parent company is relatively high.
According to the transaction cost theory, only one optimal entry mode is assumed to be
decided as long as entering the same foreign market in the given time. In effect, however,
we shouldn’t neglect the possible coexistence of two types of market entry modes at the
same time or phase even if a licensing agreement appears to be earlier than Rugman’s
proposition. Therefore foreign direct investment is realized while exporting goods from a
parent company to the same target country where its subsidiary is located. Or a licensing
agreement is concluded with a local partner (licensee) as a parent company has determined
releasing its technology under it, at the same time when its subsidiary operates a local
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production factory.
Then we show the latter case among the simultaneous behavior of plural entry strategies
by MNEs. By using plural entry modes in the same host country, MNEs should gain more
profits than selecting only a local production in the subsidiary. In terms of enacting a
licensing agreement at the same time as a local production in the subsidiary, MNEs may
fear dissipation costs of knowledge. But if MNEs select plural entry modes such as an
operation in the subsidiary and licensing to a local company, they seem to get higher profits
than a single activity of wholly-owned subsidiary’s foreign production in the host country.
The ground is explained by the following equation.
Taking advantage of the highly valued technology developed by MNEs simultaneously in
their local subsidiaries and an independent local firm is justified as long as the net profit is
higher in this case than a single foreign business such as either only a local production in
the subsidiary or licensing to an independent manufacturer. Here one MNE is termed as A,
and a local independent licensee is denoted as B. In the first assumption that A chooses a
licensing while continuing the subsidiary’s local production, A can get a higher rate of its
licensing fee from B compared with the net sales profit rate gained by A’s subsidiary from
its local production. But only this condition isn’t enough to postulate a simultaneous entry
behavior of A. Here we have to consider A’s total licensing revenue divided into two parts
Figure 1. Conversion of the Optimal Market Entry Mode by Three
Stages in Rugman’s Theory (1981)
Source) Fujisawa drew this figure summing up the theoretical essence proposed by
Rugman(.1981).
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not only accruing from B but also from A’s subsidiary, as a A’s subsidiary should also have
been paying a licensing fee to its parent company since it started the local production owing
to taking advantage of A’s parent’s technology which could be transferred under a licensing
agreement even if the bonding relationship between like a parent and a child has been kept.
As a matter of course, the licensing fee paid by A’s subsidiary is less than one done by B,
as A’s subsidiary is internalized by its parent and its subsidiary must compete with local
independent companies like B at the price level.
That is why we can propose the below formula in modeling the simultaneous foreign
market entry modes satisfying the maximum net profit for A in a given country.
 A’s subsidiary’s net sales profit rate A’s net profit rate in terms of a licensing fee
gained from its subsidiary A’s net profit rate in terms of a licensing fee gained from B.
Here such a licensing fee is denoted by a certain percent of the total sales revenue
accruing from production activities using A’s parent’s technology. In this formula we
postulate A’s parent company owns 100% of the total issued equities of its subsidiary since
setting up it abroad. Therefore all of the net sales profit recorded in A’s subsidiary can be
consolidated with A’s parent company’s net sales profit. In addition to this formula, these
three kinds of profits’ levels should change their values over time. It can be expected that in
the growth phase of a product life cycle in a host country,  may be established
and in its mature stage,  may be realized, as a technological value seems to
decline sharply over time rather than its brand value. In this way we can explain the
simultaneous market entry modes adopted by one MNE in terms of an intra-firm’s
international division of labor and inter-forms’ international division of labor seen at the
same time in a given market country. In the real business world in the latter stage of
international product life cycle, MNE may retain brand power longer than technological
value as the technological value is easily dispersed into licensees, even if licensors try to
keep a certain level of technological value in terms of technological improvement.
Contrasted with technology, brand power doesn’t tend to suffer from the dissipation risk.
The above formula brings the maximum net profit in the type of MNEs employing both
internalization and externalization of international production. In particular this formula is
supported by MNEs which emphasize the role of technological value in their foreign
operations and collect the former research and development costs at the earlier stage of
international product life cycle. Perhaps the cost performance in such a MNE is likely to be
higher than the MNE focusing on its intra-companies’ transactions, that is, internalization.
The internalization theory supported by Rugman shown in his earlier research can be
revised in order to take plural foreign market entry modes into consideration and such a
phenomenon is explained in this section.
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Figure 2. Determinants for Decision-making on Internalization and Externalization
of Managerial Resources
Source) Fujisawa drew this figure after collecting information on each company’s
R&D, production, sales and brand policies.
3. Basic Analytical Axis for Internalization and Externalization
Still now the transaction cost theory tends to mainly discuss the place or location of
using managerial resource, whereas how to develop the resources and what way should be
taken in accumulating the resource developed by MNEs have been relatively neglected in
discussion. What types of managerial resources should be developed inside MNE or bought
with a licensing-in agreement has to be treated by the MNE theorists, because developing
managerial resources within the firm has nowadays been decided by a MNE depending on
its competitive position and capabilities in addition to the technological environment. In
figure 2 we can see each company’s positioning from the perspective taking the location of
using managerial resources in the horizontal axis and the main actor of developing them in
the vertical axis.
Moreover Figure 3 shows what type of technology is more desirable in-house
development. Figure 3 depicts the new technology whose value is sharply diminished over
time isn’t adequate to develop in-house, whereas the opposite type is desirable for
developing in-house.
For example, Toshiba Co. licensed out its compressor technology to a Chinese
manufacturer and allowed the company to sell refrigerators with Toshiba brand which were
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Figure 3. In-house development type of a technology
Source) Fujisawa drew this figure.
produced by it using Toshiba’s technology before starting Toshiba’s local production of
refrigerators in its subsidiary in China. In this case Toshiba preferred externalization to
internalization in the first step and gradually move from externalization to internalization.
Such a strategy can’t be evaluated by an internalization approach. Toshiba has challenged
toward externalization of technology and brand using right in order to hedge a commercial
risk and get any stable profit by such an externalization. Since 2000 Toshiba has strongly
pushed in-house technological development and discerning its brand selling after evaluating
its marketing capability for each product. When Toshiba judges its marketing power as
relatively weak, it sells its technology to an outsider without developing a new product. In
this way the dichotomy of brand strategies such as superior and inferior branding for home
appliances has been introduced and the similar strategy will be in fashion among MNEs
whose homes are developed countries.
On the other hand, Matsushita Electric and Industry Co. merged its several group
companies into itself and taking advantages of this consolidated group system, it has
increased its making ratio of electric parts and materials which are integrated into assembly
lines for final products and sell the total products with its own brand name, Panasonic. That
is why Matsushita Electric and Industry Co. is located at left upside in Figure 2. In
particular Matsushita’s group profit ratio is high than two rival Japanese makers shown in
Fig. 2, because in-house production ratio of core parts utilized for digital home appliances
are extremely highest in Japan which means vertical production process is strongly
integrated inside Matsushita group. Owing to this group production system, quality
improvement of the parts is prospered and new parts are developed under in-group
cooperation, which can increase its sales profit ratio.
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Sony tends to lack core parts by in-house production as shown by about 85% ones
outsourced, which weakens Sony’s international competitiveness for PC and digital audio
visual products. Then Sony challenges toward raising in-house production ratio of core
parts.
Philips may be inferior to the three Japanese electric makers like Matsushita in its
technology. But Philips has developed continuously and accumulated basic core
technologies. Owing to this kind of technological advantage, Philips has successfully
retained its original strong brand power for its total technological level.
That is why Philips can discriminatingly adopt OEM (original equipment manufacturing)
procurement and original brand selling owing to strong sales network worldwide
established. This leads to keeping the totally stable competitive positions of Philips.
4. The Rule for Allocating Managerial Resources by OEM with Selling Each
Own Brand
Company A is defined as a leader MNE and B as a follower MNE. In the first phase,
Company A retains a technological advantage and sells its technology to B, Company B
manufactures a sort of finished products utilizing this licensed technology in order to supply
A with the products under an OEM agreement for A’s own brand, while some manufactured
products are sold with B’s brand. Company A has already divested from producing these
items of products. An initial condition for A is that A has not only a technological
advantage but also a brand one. Here necessary variables for analyzing both MNEs’
behavior are defined as follows.
B’s total supplying volume of finished products manufactured by B; QB
A’s selling price of its own brand; PA
B’s selling price of its own brand; PB
B’s selling price of manufactured products for A; PC
B’s total average production and supplying costs; CB
B’s ratio of selling its own brand to B’s total quantity of manufactured products;
x(0x1)
Under a licensing agreement A can receive an assured licensing fee from B. The rate of
this licensing fee is measured by a certain ratio of B’s total sales volume when producing
the products inclusive A’s technology. The rate of this licensing fee’ is denoted as y and y is
found like 0y1. Since starting B’s manufacturing the related products, it’s postulated A
has no touch with supplying parts and materials for A’s production.
Among the above variables, a few initial conditions are found. As A’s brand can be sold
at a higher price than B’s brand, PAPB is assured. In addition to it, as B has to incur sales
promotion costs when selling its manufactured products with B’s brand, B is enforced to set
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its own brand price higher than the selling price of B’s products for A. Then PBPC is
assumed. Moreover B has to get some adding values from its manufacturing so as to keep
producing. So PCCB is naturally found.
Thus the initial conditions are made sure as follows.
PAPBPCCB, Therefore, PAPB2PC 
Here the transportation, tariff and insurance costs are neglected when A imports all
manufactured products from B for simplification of discussion. Rather several variables are
added to the above variables.
Annual A’s total profit; RA
A’s revenue of licensing fee; LA
A’s sales profit with its own added brand value; BA
B’s total profit; RB
Here RALABA.
LAPBQBxyPCQB (1x) y 
BA(PAPC) QB (1x) 
RB(PBCB) QBx(PCCB) QB (1x) 
Then the A’s residual technological development cost is denoted as TA and its total R&D
cost related this technology is TO.
Each sales year for A since a new product was introduced by A in the market is defined
as I, and the years since A released its own technology is shown by k. The equation is set
as follows.

In the first A’s decision-making to involve selling its technology to B depends on the
condition satisfying RALABARB, as long as TA0 is continued. The reason why if
LABARB, A has to leave TA at the time of licensing out and find the total future
revenue gained by A may be lower than that of B. In this case A may notice that A would
have never had a motive for its technological development. If TA0 is assumed by A but as
a result of licensing out, LABARB is realized, A can’t perform to collect the total cost
for its technological development and sunk cost will be arisen. This sunk cost is seen a kind
of transaction costs.
Therefore as far as A’s rational behavior is assured, the following formula is established.

Derived from the equation , the condition for defining the rate of licensing fee is
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shown as the below.

In the next phase, at the time period of TA0, A’s technological value is diminishing
while B’s brand is going up. That is why PBPC may be established as a price negotiation
term. Consequently B’s brand value tends to equivalent with the market price evaluated by
actual traders. Therefore PBPC can be substituted into equation , the new equation  is
derived.

Finally, at TA0, B can strengthen its brand power and B’s brand selling price becomes
equal to the world standard price, which can be denoted as PAPBPC. Thus the
negotiation concerning the existing technology becomes against A. Taking advantage of such
a reversal on the licensing fee, B becomes stronger than A in deciding the fee shown by .

In addition to such an analysis, so as to solve the optimal condition for A in licensing
out, one stable equilibrium about the rate of A’s technological licensing fee should be
derived from totally differentiating equation  under y´0 as follows.

As X is constrained to be non-negative and (1PC) PB is clearly kept,

As PAPBPACB is established, A’s stable time period concerning A’s negotiating
power over its licensing fee is defined as below.

In such a condition that A’s sales added value is higher than B’s manufacturing added
value, A becomes more advantageous over B in negotiating its licensing fee.
But in the case of (PAPC)  (PBPC), A becomes to never expect the agreement
beneficial to A. That is, when A’s sales profit ratio with A’s brand is below B’s sales profit
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Figure 4. Conceptual Framework for the Determinants of FDI
ratio with B’s brand value which is made clear by PCCB, A is forced to reduce its status
for negotiating the licensing fee.
In conclusion, A should start its licensing out from the time period satisfying the
condition of PC PACB2 and determine to expire its licensing agreement at the time
coincident withPAPCPBPC.
5. A conceptual Framework and Theoretical Integration
Here we employ a simple framework depicted in Figure 4 in which information cost and
communication cost are built in influencing factors of FDI (foreign direct investment) as
well as transaction cost when considering the determinants of Japanese makers’ FDI.
The theoretical background is also essentially required. Whether a wholly-owned or joint
venture type of FDI has been preferred by Japanese parents should be clarified comparing
with other entry modes such as licensing and exporting plants. All of manufacturers should
have strong firm specific advantages in entering each foreign market by setting up their
wholly-owned subsidiaries equal to internalization. Before entering foreign countries most of
manufacturers might hold any strategic intent mainly divided into globalization or
localization, as such a strategic motive may influence on the performance of each subsidiary.
Then let us proceed to explain the determinants of several kinds of entry modes.
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Table 1. Transaction Cost(TC) and other costs by types of entry
modes; relative sizes in each cost
Entry mode TC IC CC Sales E S
Exporting
plants
Med.
DC Low Low Low  
Licensing HighestDCPC Low Low Medium  
Joint venture High DC,PC, SC Med. High Large  
Wholly-
owned sub. Low High Med. Large  
Note; IC=Information cost, CC=Communication cost, E=Easiness for Entry among
firms, S=Specific asset needed in entering markets
Source; Takeshi Fujisawa’s consideration referring to theory proposed
by Rugman and Casson
Table 1 illustrates that manufacturers must hold specific assets in entering foreign
countries so as to compete with their rival makers not only in a host country but also in the
world market, as long as it tries to raise its market share there. In order to sharply raise its
market share, a local production in a wholly-owned subsidiary becomes a promising entry
mode. Setting up a wholly-owned subsidiary makes sure to be the fastest way for attaining
such a goal. Since this entry mode strongly commits corporate resources to link with many
markets. Consequently once such a project fails in, this MNE has to take the highest risk
and feels it hard to recover from a crucial damage. To make a wholly-owned subsidiary
stronger, a parent must develop the strongest asset specificity in technologies or knowledge
enough for its subsidiary to be transferred to learn well. From a long perspective, its
subsidiaries can be expected toward developing an original design of technology and
business model.
This entry mode has a merit in that it can erase transaction costs (TC) by the following
reasons. A manufacturer’s parent can transfer its technology and knowledge to its subsidiary
without caring about market inefficiencies illustrated by unstably evaluated value of a new
technology due to the lack of technology market mechanism and asymmetry information as
well as unduly moral hazard by a licensee where a new type of technology may be sold to
the third party by this licensee ignoring the licensing agreement concluded between a
license holder and technology buyer. So as to prevent from opportunistic behavior of a
licensee, its licensor must always watch and audit his behavior. Therefore the licensor often
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becomes to face with policing costs (PC), although it might not be able to perfectly control
its licensee to act freely with moral hazard, even if it has been continuing paying such costs
since the licensing agreement was established.
As a matter of fact, a licensing at the early stage of its product life cycle like a new
product introduction phase, that is, such an early licensing is too risky for a licensor as it
enforces the licensor to pay the highest dissipation cost (DC) of a technology and
knowledge as licensee will soon catch up with the licensor after selling big volume of the
products whose technology is derived from the licensor who may lose its product market
share while the licensee can emulate the licensed technology which enables the licensee to
develop its own technology in the near future so called catching up process with an original
licensor.
Before setting up a wholly-owned subsidiary, a manufacturer has to research where is
best for locating its subsidiary and when to start its operation, market research and
feasibility study are required for this MNE. That is why the MNE must pay high
information costs (IC) from the feasibility study. After it starts operation in its subsidiary,
this MNE has to incur high IC cost so that the parent controls and coordinates many
subsidiaries when integrating the role of each subsidiary into its global strategy. How to
integrate a variety of subsidiaries into the corporate level of global strategy depends on
much information available to the parent. As a result of information processing, this MNE
can work together with its local subsidiaries. Communication costs (CC) become more
important after a local production and R&D start between a parent and its wholly-owned
subsidiaries. The managers of local subsidiaries also regard the mutual communication most
important with each other in extending some transactions within the firm beyond national
borders and parent’s mandate. In this way, CC will be augmented.
A joint venture, however, demands both partners to pay maximum CC for conducting an
optimal decision-making. If one’s goals become divergent from another partner’s ones, both
managers must often keep in touch with each other, and many times attend a congress or
meeting in addition to an ordinary discussion. The decision-making in a joint venture tends
to be delayed (particularly in a equality ownership type of joint venture) and such a slow
style of decision-making and delayed or postponed project worsen both partners’ business
performances due to the late response to the changing environment. To solve this problem,
sharing information shouldn’t be neglected. That is why a joint venture must incur relatively
high IC instead of saving the highest CC. Even if CC and IC can be covered by MNE,
another big problem happens to a joint venture partner.
Sunk costs (SC) may be caused by opportunistic behavior of one side of the partner
when another partner has invested huge resources and cash into its own plant whose type is
limited to a specific usage for production. If one partner comes to reject selling the product
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Figure 5. Integrating Information Costs into Decision-making
on FDI Types: Its Expected Effect of Information
on Product Market & Labor Market
made in this joint venture, another partner, that is, a real plant owner can’t compensate such
a facility investment cost as another type of product can’t be fertilized or assembled in its
joint venture’s plant. Such a partner is enforced to give up covering SC, while an
opportunistic partner doesn’t have will to pay for SC. Partnership tends to be easily
collapsed as soon as the production and sales regulation specified in the joint venture
agreement can’t be observed by one partner who has never touched with the facility
investment.
TC is therefore comprised of three cost factors;  DC,  PC,  SC. Obviously at the
same time, TC has some relations with IC and CC.
Then proceed to build theoretical models. At first focusing on the role of information
collecting costs (ICC) used to research a product market and a labor market for each type of
entry mode, a theoretical framework can be built as shown in Figure 5. This scheme is lent
itself to explain what type of entry mode is best for a manufacturer depending on the
requirement levels of ICC allotted for a product market (PM) and labor market (LM)..
Figure 5 illustrates foreign direct investment (FDI) may be classified into a wholly-
owned, majority joint venture (JV) and a minority JV. What type of FDI is preferred is
determined by the production (process) method of whether abundant labor should be
employed etc. For example, a minority JV is suitable to small lot of production as one
partner can’t have much interest on business performance compared with running majority
JV. More interested in majority JV, we notice the manufacturer who is eager to research a
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Figure 6. Dynamic Change after Marketing Research
labor market and save some product market research costs tends to adopt a labor intensive
production method, whereas a manager of a majority JV partner who emphasizes the role of
marketing research on its own product rather than collecting information on a labor market,
a capital intensive facility seems to be utilized. A wholly-owned FDI prefers a high-tech and
mass production employing a labor intensive facility.
Take the dynamism after marketing research (MR) on a specific product into
consideration as seen in Figure 6. Figure 6 depicts expanding product market as a result of
a manufacturer’s marketing effort induces to move a utility function of the product to be
right upward as curve E shifts from the original curve D. Corresponding to the shift of a
utility function curve, production frontier curve A or C goes up to the right so as to touch
utility function curve E at the point G. When a manufacturer has prompted labor market
research (LMR), the company has come to utilize production frontier curve C shifted from
curve A.
If the manufacturer has been spending cash on MR, its production frontier curve might
have a tendency for converging on the frontier curve B to meet a touching point G.
Consequently there is a co-relationship between MR costs for a specific product and LMR
costs and this relationship gives an effect on the production method in a manner that even if
an originally labor intensive production method was selected, the heavy MR on a product
would induce the production method to be more capital-intensive.
Finally build the hypothesized relationships among three cost factors by market entry
modes in terms of relative cost sizes by such entry types in each business.
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Figure 7. The Hypothesized Relationships among three
Cost Factors by Entry Modes: The Relative
Cost Sizes by Entry Modes in Each Business
In figure 7 exporting plants (E.P.) shares a position of a starter for becoming MNE.
This figure aims to follow changing cost factors over time, that is, focus on the relative
size of costs alongside the time horizon. Then explain the changing costs.
For exporting plants, there is a general relationship such as CCTCIC. CC incurs
entailing technological instructions for a plant importer.
For Licensing, TCCCIC is easily established, for DC of a technology is highest on
average than any other entry modes proposed by Rugman, as externalizing the firm’s asset
specificity and thus the licensee may appear as its competitor in the world market.
In the case of JV three hypothesized relationships are explored without considering
internalization models proposed by Rugman etc. Rather linking with the decision-making
speed for JV partner’s managers and their relationships with local partners and headquarters.
For a minority JV, TCCCIC.
An equally-owned JV is expected to establish TCCCIC. CC is highest among all
entry modes, as it takes long time and largest frequency in business decisions between the
partners concerned who have the same decision-making rights.
A majority JV has a different aspect. The higher equity ownership ratio in JV ensures the
parent company to appropriate its own asset specificity, contributing to reduce TC.
Another face of a majority JV in TC is thought to be more interesting.
According to Casson’s theory (2000), IC has TC related field to some extent. Namely, to
recognize an inseparable sphere from TC in IC is to be emphasized. What overlapping field
with TC can be seen in IC? A TC-unrelated factor of IC is to search for skillful labors and
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extension to a new market. On the other hand SC accruing from JV partner’s opportunistic
behavior are often seen in its own facility invested by the majority owner parent company.
as such a parent tends to mainly invest into its subsidiary’s plant. This factor is counted as
IC related with TC.
We should discern TC-related IC from TC-unrelated IC (pure IC). In the case of a
wholly-owned subsidiary, ICCCTC is plausibly applicable to many MNE. Over the
years having passed since a wholly-owned subsidiary was established, it may come to be
positioned in a series of world mandate strategy type by its headquarters. By this IC will
continue augmenting in order to develop the world market and look for new transaction
partners like in supply chain management.
6. Theoretical Approach to the Foreign Market Entry Behavior of Software
Developers
Here we aim to build the analytical framework for explaining how to internationalize in
terms of focusing on what foreign market entry strategies in software developers (thereafter
this term is denoted as SD) are inclined to be sequentially selected. In the first phase
comparing with how to select foreign market entry strategies for manufacturers, the foreign
market entry behaviors of SD are explored taking their industry characteristics unique to
them into consideration.
In this observation whether the sequential development of foreign market entry strategies
tends to depend on the transaction cost approach is reviewed. In addition to it, the analytical
framework for explaining empirical evidence is also presented.
First we describe the characteristics of SD among service industry firms and consider
what main motives for internationalization of SD are.
In general it is thought SD belong to the typical knowledge-intensive industry. According
to the empirical research covered by Contractor and et. all, their global developments are
naturally limited as their industry has a characteristic of knowledge-intensive industry. Their
host countries are also confined as long as it is more desirable that they have such industry
characteristic.
In this meaning the worldwide involvement of SD may be enforced to face with the
upper limit, opposed to the situation that hotels, restaurants hypermarkets and department
stores have evolved in globalization of their businesses with their chains development. That
is, the industry characteristics constraint the location of SD in the world.
Therefore SD should consider the determinants in selecting foreign market entry modes
without ignoring the limit of their globalization degree and the uniqueness of SD to become
international actors related with industry characteristics and business models. There should
be ten factors influencing on SD’s internationalization levels.
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1. Ineffective scale economies
2. Service embodied in a specific person which can’t be separated from an individual
whose capability and human relationship are specific.
3. Continuous transaction which becomes intangible asset and influences on selecting
market entry modes.
4. Asset specificity emphasized in market entry modes more than scale advantage (capital
intensity)
5. Relatively easier integration of brand image
6. Smaller development costs as an absolute value.
7. Accounting contractual costs related with a contractor (previous cost) and policing
costs happened to audit whether the contractor has behaved in keeping with the
contractual conditions which give an impact on the business performance of its
consigner.
8. Language abilities vital for the success of business
9. Access to main customers including contractors or embedding them
10. Outsourcing versus Developing (Internal developing)
Here we expect many SD may begin with developing soft products in entering a foreign
market and then tend to shift to outsourcing over time from the below reasons.
In the first stage of internationalization, many SD may feel it hard to look for and find
out foreign customers. Then they want to get jobs of developing software from their
domestic major SD or foreign famous SD. By these works they can start exporting software
according to the specific manual and order contents given by the consigners. Taking these
initial conditions into consideration, SD had better invest enough cash into their internal
development.
In the second stage of internationalization, most of SD must get conscious to perform the
above 10 factors as much as they can to the degree of their facing with more foreign
customers at the same time. Among these asset specificity and capital intensity seem to
become most powerful independent variables in determining internalization or
externalization of SD. That is why we should review the possibility of applying the
traditional transaction cost approach to the internationalization of SD.
Originally the traditional transaction cost theory has focused on explaining the foreign
market entry behaviors of oligopolistic manufacturers. The firm specific factors such as size,
rich international experience, the number of holding technologies protected by patents for a
certain time period, huge investments into R&D can provide such oligopolistic
manufacturers with choosing many opportunities for internalization. In particular product
technologies leading to global de-facto standard can ease to develop the global market.
On the other hand, SD have to face with a limit to monopolize their markets among
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many service industry firms except for an operation soft and application soft provided by
Microsoft etc. Due to the low development cost per soft project relative to the new products
of high technology makers, SD mustn’t be involved in competing scale extension. The firm
specific advantage of SD can’t be measured by the development cost.
But the emulation often happens to soft products and they are relatively easier to be
emulated and copied by their competitors and customers etc, even if the products are so
new. Therefore the dissipation risk should be substantially discounted in counting the value
of soft products.
Because of these particular reasons discussing the internationalization process of SD
doesn’t seem to be adequate as far as introducing the traditional transaction cost approach is
concerning.
Then let’s the more refined transaction cost theory posited by Krishna, M.E. & Rao, C.P.
(1993) introduce in the next and review the applicability of their theory to the expected
internationalization process of SD, that is, to make sure the prophecy of its more refined
transaction cost theory.
According to Krishna, M.E. & Rao, C.P. , there are three points to be focused on such as
 the trade off between control(profits of integrating businesses) and resource commitment
costs in the transaction cost approach,  the relationship between asset specificity and entry
mode choice,  the relationship between capital intensity and entry mode choice.
By integrating such three relationships into reconsideration, the observed relationship
between capital intensity and desire for shared-control modes can be in particular
formulated.
Namely the estimated model includes all the main effects, including asset specificity and
moderators and the hypothesized interaction effects. Preliminary analysis led the authors to
believe that the relationship between capital intensity and entry mode choice is not liner
over the range of values considered in the analysis.
As capital intensity increases from “low” to “moderate” levels, the propensity to employ
shared-control modes increases, as expected shown in Figure 8. As it increases from
“moderate” to “high” levels, the propensity to share control diminishes, contrary to
expectations (Figure 8). The reasons why firms avoid shared-control modes at high levels of
capital intensity aren’t always clear; perhaps they feel compelled to protect their rather
heavy investments by integration. Notwithstanding its origin, this nonlinearity necessitated
the inclusion in the model of two quadratic terms, [capital intensity]2 and asset specificity
 [capital intensity]2.
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Figure 8. The Observed Relationship between Capital Intensity
and Propensity to Employ Shared-Control Modes
Figure 9. The Observed Relationship between Asset Specificity
and Propensity to Employ Shared-Control
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Figure 10. The Assumed Sequences of International Market
Entry Modes: The Cases of Software Developers
To understand the relationship further, note the estimated probability of employing shared
-control modes at low and high levels of asset specificity as it is illustrated by Figure 9. As
a firm’s asset specificity moves to “very high” levels, the slope of a line can be depicted to
slow down, whereas low-specificity firms prefer shared-control modes (joint venture) to full
control ones (wholly-owned subsidiary).
What on earth are SD likely to follow the above two lines? In order to examine this, add
their industrial characteristics to the theoretical model’s figures. SD are compelled to know
some constraints before penetrating the world market for their software due to different
languages and unfamiliar cultural context, which make a bad effect on exporting software
and acquiring orders to develop software, though many SD may reach business chances to
some foreign countries throughout internal development. But except for some country
markets advantageous to SD, most of them seem to suffer from developing new markets.
That is why SD are inclined to conclude joint development agreement for a new software
and rely on consortium or try to search for a new software developer trusted by the SD.
Therefore the internationalization process or sequences of entry modes changed by SD
should be obviously explored by a theoretical approach.
In figure 10 the expected sequential development of market entry modes chosen by SD is
illustrated introducing asset specificity and internal control degrees connecting capital
intensity. This figure might be revised version of original figures sketched by Krishna, M.E.
& Rao, C.P.
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If SD are likely to prefer internalization approach, they move on the lines from A to D.
On the other hand, SD start with B throughout C, finally turn to D, their option comes to
follow such an internationalization approach as served by Root, F (1982).
The selection process for SD are mainly likely to follow the internationalization approach
since several explanative factors support strongly the route BCD.
Generally the internationalization of SD begin with a trusted developer type exporter
serving their consigners with software or exporting a technology for developing software
their customers have been wanting. In both entry modes, SD have to satisfy the specification
requested by their customers and such specification resembles so strong tacit knowledge that
asset specificity can be highly required for the SD. As long as the SD involve with
exporting products and/ or technologies, their capital intensity is low because a rental office
is usually their main business place. According to the model of Krishna, M.E. & Rao, C.P.,
shared-control modes aren’t fitted to this first stage. At the same time SD can’t exert strong
control over such earlier international operations.
Over time SD come to accumulate many kinds of knowledge about many foreign
markets and how to develop software while their company name and brand power have
been well known by the potential customers and competitors in the world. Then SD are
inclined to choose developing and producing and selling software with their original brand
in their own channel and sometimes in the outside channels. These internal complete
operation methods necessitate huge investments in developing software at the main inland
and overseas business units as well as extending sales networks abroad. As a matter of fact,
the fee for purchasing PC and training cost for fostering many excellent engineers become
increasing. Consequently these SD realize the maximization of capital intensity in this
phase. As the SD make an effort to develop software inside them, asset specificity in their
software is extremely high. In this meaning, taking advantage of added value chain makes
the SD choose a sole investment, that is, setting up wholly owned subsidiaries or branches
or project offices in target market countries and the nations whose software skill is
abundant. There the SD can get sole projects and original software development.
After SD worldwide have gained so many customers that they can’t internally develop
software offered by main and important customers abroad, they are enforced to take an
option of outsourcing for some software so as to keep the delivery date of software
customer have required. Subsequently the mixture of internal development and outsourcing,
that is ordering the external software houses to develop software in accordance with
customers’ needs after the SD themselves have accepted some orders from their customers.
In line with enlarging this mixture type, the role of consigners in finding out external
software houses is becoming increasing. The development and production volume of
software outside the SD is raised up and its share is becoming higher and higher, while the
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SD receive sales profit from their trusted developers. The SD naturally weaken capital
intensity ratio and asset specificity. The SD might think that establishing new joint ventures
with the present trusted developers or competitors is most desirable for maintaining
worldwide customers.
Here one problem should be pointed out in order to conclude which approach is more
persuasive for observing the internationalization sequences of SD. If partnership stage has
been stepped by SD before setting up a local subsidiary or branch or office, the
internationalization approach is true for the internationalization process of SD. When SD
hasn’t been through the partnership phase, the internalization approach comes to have a
more strongly explanative power; namely, starting from a trusted developer (consignee) and
then moving directly to setting up a foreign subsidiary, branch or office.
Reviewing the actual application of the internalization versus internationalization
approach, it might be concluded that SD are likely to prefer an internationalization approach
to internalization one as shown by the following four stages.
The first stage; a trusted software developer or a licensor
The second stage; making a partnership agreement or entering into a consortium
arrangement, transaction with affiliated companies
The third stage; establishing a subsidiary, branch, office and project office
The fourth stage; the mixture of internal development and outsourcing from the
perspective of a consigner
The theoretical model developed by Krishna, M.E. & Rao, C.P. is rather useful for
exploring the decision-making rules of SD to internationalize their software businesses, in
particular, it is highly believed that low capital intensity doesn’t support shared-control
modes.
7. Decision-making Model for SD’s Foreign Market Entry Modes
Many independent and dependent variables available to solving the problem of what
entry mode is best for SD in various situations are shown and specify the all variables based
on each definition.
R1: import sales volume of software developed by other companies
R2: total revenue by licensing out internally developed software technology to other
companies
R3: total revenue by selling internally developed software with its original brand
I1: total cost of importing externally developed software
M1: sales promotion expenses for software imported
M3: sales promotion expenses for internally developed software with its original brand
M4: sales promotion expenses of software depending on the development ratio of consignees
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P1: net profit by importing and selling externally developed software
P2: net profit by licensing out internally developed software technology to other companies
P3: net profit by selling internally developed software with its original brand
P4: total net mixed profit of by selling internally developed software with its original brand
and selling its software served for another brand
O1: opportunity costs incurred due to missing the sales of internally developed software
O2: opportunity costs incurred due to licensing out internally developed software technology
to other companies
D1: expenses required for developing an internal existing software, some of which will be
contributing to developing the next generation software (it is postulated that its
depreciation has already expired)
D2: existing software development costs incurred before licensing out internally developed
software technology
D3: newly additional costs for developing the next generation software
r2: technological dissipation costs accompanied with licensing out an internally developed
software technology (0r21)
What degree of share the existing software development expense is expected to account
for in contributing to save the development cost for the next generation software assuming
that the existing software technology can create the next one is defined as α (0α1).
Then, O1R3(D3D1α)M3 
In order not to incur O1, the vital condition is to establish as below.
R3D3D1α 
The constraint  relates to mean that huge investment costs should bear in order to
succeed in the new generation software and the synergy effect between the new generation
one and the existing one can’t be greatly brought out, thus that is why the technological
continuity is trivial, which results in not bearing O1.
As P1 has co-relationship with O1, thus the below equation can come true.
P1R1I1M1O1 

The above left item in the right equation shows the sales net profit of imported software
over years (n) since the stage its related opportunity has never been accounted. Its right item
describes the opportunity cost due to not developing software inside the SD and selling it.
Therefore equation  is shown.
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
Generally when the opportunity cost is larger than the development cost, the internal
development should be selected.
On the other hand, how SD estimate the profit accrued from licensing out the software
internally developed over years (n) should be considered. If the technology licensed out can
contribute to develop other software, technological dissipation risk will happen. As a result
of such risk (r2) is taken into consideration, the net profit by licensing out internally
developed software technology to other companies is defined as equation .
P2R2D2O2 
The net profit accruing from licensing out internally developed software technology over
years (n) may bring technological dissipation cost (r2). When the technological dissipation
cost (r2) is higher, it reduces the net sales profit of its technological license out. Therefore
equation  can be shown.

In the third, the net profit accrued from selling internally developed software with its
own brand is described by equation . It should be noted that the business types of selling
such software are mainly divided into sales with its original brand and via trusted
development. Here the development degree of trusted development accounted for total order
volume from customers is denoted as β (0β1).
The higher this degree is, the lesser naturally its sales expense is, because the consigner
sells software marking its own brand and thus pays for market development activities with
its own cash.
Instead of it, its sales profit ratio becomes reduced compared with selling original brand
as its consignee must give up gaining some of sales profit due to its consigner (buyer)’s
holding the goodwill of selling software. Consequently the ratio of the consignee’s giving
up sales profit to its consigner accompanied with this trusted development for consigner’s
brand is defined as γ (0γ1). In this way considering the business model of the
consignee in exporting its software for its consignor, sales promotion expenses of software
depending on the development ratio of consignees is denoted as M4 and then define as M4
M3 (1β).
Assuming that total sales revenue is the same in both own brand selling and OEM
(original equipment manufacturing), and R&D cost is required in both types, the sales net
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Table 2. Cost Requirements & Expected Revenues by Foreign Market Entry Modes
Determinants of Costs &
Revenues
Entry Modes
Internal
Development
Cost
Internal
Sales Cost
Dissipation
Cost of
Technology
Opportunity
Cost
Cost of
Switching
Customers
Expected
Revenue
Import Sales of Externally
Developed Software Zero Small Zero Small Zero Small
Licensing Out of Internally
Developed Software Technology Big Zero Big Big Small Medium
Selling Internally Developed
Software with Its Other Brand Big Small Small Medium Medium Big
Selling Internally Developed
Software with Its Own Brand Big Big Zero Zero Big Big
Source; Fujisawa’s original by applying the transaction cost theory to this framework.
profit derived from the mixed type is derived from the equation .

From this equation, P4 can show a bigger value when satisfying R3γM30, forβ0.
Therefore as long as satisfying R3γM30, that is, γ M3R3 , it is more desirable for a
consignee to raise the ratio of an OEM supply of software developed by it in order to gain a
more sales net profit. Such a condition that M3 becomes greatly bigger than R3γ is best
required for a consignee so long as the larger βis, forβ0.
In Table 2, what factors become to have a great impact on choosing what types of
foreign market entry modes can be distinguished among import sales of internally developed
software with its own brand depending on cost requirements and expected revenues etc.
8. Summary and Conclusion
This article challenges renewing the transaction cost approach proposed by Rugman
(1980, 1981). The Rugman’s traditional approach can be modified by introducing the
simultaneous market entry behavior in a certain time period where both a wholly-owned
subsidiary and a licensing to a local independent firm are realized in terms of taking a
licensing fee paid by a subsidiary to a parent company into consideration in the model.
As the second factor we particularly focus on the development of managerial resources
which is given in the above Rugman’s traditional theory. Whether MNEs have to develop
their managerial resources depends on not only each product division’s strategic position but
also its diminishing ratio over time rather than their using types. This thinking is beyond the
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Rugman’s idea that an earlier licensing out is risky as the dissipation risk of a technology
becomes higher by this choice. Here it is postulated that even a new technology can be sold
to an independent firm if its value is sharply diminished over its age.
In the next we propose the equation model which treats the brand values and
technological values for a leader MNE and a follower MNE under assuming both brand
values are correlated with the licensing fee revenue gained by a leader MNE as its
technology’s age becomes older. Focusing on an OEM, each brand value is analyzed over
time. Externalizing a specific technology may be prosper in that the brand value of a leader
MNE is kept enough to sell the procured products with an OEM agreement at a higher price
than its follower manufacturing and selling the products for its leader. This model describes
what time period is best for selling a technology and divesting from selling the procured
products with its own brand for a leader MNE, which is unique as the Rugman’s traditional
model may ignore the relationship between the sales price difference influenced by both
types’ of brand values and the changing licensing fee affected by ages of new technology.
To build a joint venture model is necessary for its further research in order to take an
insight into the allocation of managerial resources by a leader MNE and a follower MNE,
where a quasi-internalization (an ownership type) and a quasi-externalization (a contractual
type) is mixed. Such hybrid types of strategic alliances are explored by Oxley (1999), which
should be explored first.
Some propositions derived from TC and IC and CC underlie the background for
explaining what entry mode should be chosen among exporting plants, licensing, minority
joint venture, majority joint venture and wholly-owned subsidiary. A few significant
conclusions can be derived from applying such an integrative approach to the above entry
modes over time. All Four turning points can be made clear in such ways as 1) from
exporting plants to licensing, 2) from licensing to minority joint venture, 3) from minority
joint venture to equal or majority joint venture, 4) from equal or majority joint venture to
wholly-owned subsidiary. These turning points depend on the weights of three variables
shared by each entry mode. In addition to this, a product market research and labor market
research can contribute for MNE to decide on what method of production should be
introduced in its subsidiary’s factory considering the factor endowment in a local country.
Information costs and communication costs may be helpful to discern the sequences of
foreign market entry modes and their types selected by Japanese manufacturers for their
home society belongs to collectivism. Due to the lack of firm-specific data, however, we
haven’t fully reached the comprehensive analysis of market entry sequences based on asset
specificity which is a peculiar to a transaction cost approach.
In the last analysis, O2 ( = opportunity costs incurred due to licensing out internally
developed software technology to other companies) and r2( = technological dissipation costs
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accompanied with licensing out internally developed software technology) are taken into
consideration so as to examine the impact of these two costs on the selection of foreign
market entry modes for software developers (SD). These two costs essentially pertain to a
sort of transaction costs. We suggest that whether SD prefer selling internally developed
software with its own brand to selling or supplying it under other brand is determined by
both less O2 and r2 which are close to zero, given the expected revenue of the latter mode is
almost as same as the one of the former where huge cost of switching customers incurs.
This article should challenge for the robust design of more comprehensive research
which can be tailored to the recent phenomena. In order to attain this goal and overcome
such a crucial task, we need to integrate a resource-based view as well as the product and
process architecture concept as significant determinants with the existing transaction cost
approach for carefully exploring an optimal foreign market entry mode adequate to each
situation where MNEs have confronted until now. In particularly an OEM supply can be
powerfully validated in theory and practice by applying this more integrative framework to
conversion from a wholly-owned subsidiary to an OEM contract.
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